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Ideally, any peacetime effort on the part of professional
military people should oe a part of their overall training for
participation in war. 1 now fina myself amon<_ the hundreds of
career service officers who are concerned with the study and
execution of financial management in the Armed Forces. Experience
in World War II and the horean War, ana my readings in the history
of those conflicts have not served to impress me with the impor-
tance of military fiscal management a3 a tool of reat benefit to
us in periods of mobilization. Since I am becoming acquainted
with the principles of military business administration in time
of peace, I am interested in estimating the relative worth of
such principles uurinL war-time. Since some military commanders
feel that the^ are ooli^ed to use thei ople as "oue^et clerks"
and "bookeepers" in peacetime, the;, are entitled to know what
services of value these personnel, ana the system under which
the^. operate, maj afford when a^ comes.
If this paper serves to provide a basis for provokii
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The civilians 1 primary tool in controlling the military
is money. In peacetime the Congress establishes the size and
composition of the Defense Department annually by appropriation
acts. The President ana the civilian secretaries of military
departments exercise a check rein on Army-Navy-Air Force policy
primarily bj means of budget administration or "business
administration", in the Navy, for example, the tasks of the
civilian executives consist almost wholly of business anu budget
matters:
The Secretary is directly responsible for the first of the
four basic tasks or functions of artment, the task
of poll c3 control; additionally! he is oirectl^ concerned with
relations with the public, morale, and budget matters. The
Civilian .executive Assistants are charged with the responsibility
for assuring that the "business aamini stration" of the bureaus,
boards, and offices of the Navy Department is properly aaministerec
Since World War II the size of the military budget and the
complexity of organization of the Department of Defense have
produced problems of far reaching consequence to the taxpayer*
The Department is fully aware of this and has improved its
financial management organization ana practices. It nas taken
the position that effective performance as a whole requires
effective financial corcptrollership both at the Department of
^united States government urbanization manual 19^1-,
(Washington, D. C: aovermment Printing Office, 19^1), p. li+O.

2Defense level and within each of its component departments, the
Anrij, the Havyj and the Air r'orce. Montyf almost to the exciusior
of all else, has become the primary means of management control.
In response to this stimuli the services have in turn
establishes elaoorate systems for financial management. The
dollar sit_n is attached to every function and is used as a
common denominator in measuring either management efficiency or
need. Thousands of service personnel each peacetime year, find
themselves concerned intimately with budgets, obligations,
expenditures, accounting and other financial subjects. Profes-
sional military men in recognition of the role and significance
of military budgets in the national economy are now eivin^
considered thought to service requirements in terms of dollars
as well as personnel or equipage, oince World War II management
of the Armed Services has been improved by the adoption of pro-
gram budgets, comptrollers organizations, the apportionment
process, stock funds, new accounting systems, and other financial
programs. These were designed for the purpose of preventing the
inefficient use of funds and have become a primary means of
managerial control.
If the dollar is used as the primary management control
instrument in peace time, how will it work in war? Since 19lj-5
the government has evolved an elaborate budget process and a
significant expenditure control system. Will these operate

3efficiently upon mobilization for a major conflict? As a manage-
ment tool, how effective will they be?
Any answer to these questions can only be an appraisal.
3uch an estimate, however, can be made by referencing past
experience, by examining new developments in military financial
programs, ana by noting advances in the field of scientific
management which have been introduced into the department of
Defense. This estimate 3hould also furnish the basis for a
consideration of the relative importance of budget administra-
tion, comptroilership, and ancillary functions in peace and in
war.
The following chapters will discuss the requirement for,
and tae means of management control of the military. Space will
be taken to narrate management experiences in wars of the past.
Present military financial management organizations and functions
will be examined with a view toward their probable operating
effectiveness during future emergencies.

CHAPTER I
MEANS OF MILIT, MEHS
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the means of
management control presently availuole to exercise directly,
Ldinfc and restraining power over the military, r'irst, it is
pertinent to review some concepts of management control and show
where they exist in the militai .
The constitutional doctrine of civilian supremacy over
military authority is as old as tue United States, oo too, so
say, is the problem of makin^ it effective. 9 translation of
thi3 principle into practice is more important today than ever
before because of the increases in the economic impact of military
expenditures in peace ariu war. in the Navy iJepartment, civilian
heads exercise their supremacy by reserving to themselves matters
of overall policy, logistics administration and control, and
business administration, Naval command only is left outside
their purview* 2
A similar situation exists in the other services and
throughout the i-epartment of defense. If we excluae, then, those
purely military command actions which have to do with combat
training and the actual participation of troops, ships or planes
2Ibid, p. li^O
.
5in battle, we have remaining in a ver> broad sense those functions
which pertain in the field of administration subject to the con-
trol of civilian executives within the military departments.
This is the area in which "management" operates. When we speak
of "management" in the Armed r'orces we normally are talki;
about administration which consists of the performance of
organizational and supervisory functions in can out a pro-
gram. Brery executive, civilian or in uniform, of the military
service carries the responsibility for efficient management.
Some military officers have additional responu ..ties of a
coramana nature. All, however, have administrative tasks and
must exercise effective management control over such functions.
ana^ement and administration are synonomous. It has
been said that five factors tovepn the success or failure of
management:
The first factor is a precise understanding of the job to be
done. The second is qualified and capable men in positions.
The third is a workable organization properly aaapted to the job
to be done, rhe fourth i3 a simple, airect system for carryinc
on the activities involved in the job. rhe fifth is a positive
method of checking on results, ^iven any three of these five, a
business or a&e&e^ can properl., function with fair success. Four
of them operatin c together will result in much better than average
efficiency. However, it requires all five to create the best
; i;ana cement obtainable.
^
-^Lieutenant General u-rehon Soraervilie USA, nient,"
Public Administration heview , iiutumj 19i+i+. p. 2l|..

6Management control embraces all five of the elements
mentioned aoove. If any one of these is la&in<_, control is not
complete. Incomplete control is, of course, defective control.
What techniques are now available to effect management control
throughout the militar, establishment'.'
A combination and application of four oasic administra-
tive methods conditioned by certain characteristics of program
leadership, organization, ana other factors results in the
control exercised today, are:
1. Issuance of directives to set forth policies, authorities
responsibilities and procedures* establishing a coordinated and
consistent oasis for the operation of subordinate units.
2. Authorization of specific amounts or quotas of personnel,
material, money, space, or work to be performed.
3. Prior review and approval of selected Individual trans-
actions. .
li. Review of reported information. (after the fact)^"
These four methods may be used to effect management
control of our resources: manpower, materials and money. Since
both management and materials may be controlled by concentrating
management action in dollar areas the accentuation of control
effort in terms of men and equipment rather than money may be
neglected, particularly in time of peace. Management organiza-
tion within the military today appears to reflect this philosophy,
and, further, it emphasizes the administrative method of mana&i
^" Budget Administration Methods" J Budget Execution .
Materials prepared for training, conferences on budget execution.
(Washington, D. C: bureau of the budget, 1951) p. 3.
•
7by "authorization of specific amounts . .. of money". -*
It may be argued that the i^epartment of x^efense organiza-
tion also manages bj controlling quotas of personnel or material.
Are there not powerful offices within the military depart ents
which distribute allowances of people by rank and by occupational
specialties? oo not logistic offices ration strategic materials
to particular military or civilian uses in peacetime? The answer
to both of these questions is, of course, affirmative. But it
must also be recognize d that thi c ntr 1 efficiency of these two
functions is ultimatel aaured in dollars; and is limited by
collars. This is because the Congress of the "United states is
"custodian of the military purse" limits thi cutivc
departments •
"
So management in the armed forces in peacetime must alway;
be accomplished with the dollar* si^n in mind due to Congressional
monetary limitations. Such restrictions are imposed by recogni-
tion of the strain on the national economy of supporting lar^e
military establishments. Since the productive effort of t
economy, is measure^ in dollars thev must also be used ft common
denominator in determining military requirements and in computing
the effectiveness f armeu forces management.
^ibid
. p. 3.
lias aizar, The ?urs^ aiu.- .. .c >word (Itnaca, Hew Vork:
Cornell 'university Press, 19^0), pp. 26-7.

8The importance of dollars is reflected in investigations
of management operations conducted
.
oupa of citizens outside
the government. The (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the government in I9I48 reported on a study
of the Organization unaer the provisions of the National Security
Act of 1947 • f^ne report of this ^roup emphasize a the nee a to
tive the Secretary of defense ^reater authority over the fund
requests and expenditures of the service departments,
'
A^ain in 1955 this same Commission in its report on
Budget and i.ccounting accented the importance of the dollar
budget as a management tool:
The bud<_etin£> functions are vital to the whole conduct of our
Government, In the preparation of the budget lies not only the
control of departmental expenditures but the power to insist on
efficient methods of management in the apending agencies. And
within an effective budgeting system lies the restoration of the
full control of the national purse to the Congress ..... the
executive agencies should report each year to the bureau of the
ijud et and through it to the President, on the conduct of their
operations. The proposes agency reports should permit comparison
of the costs and efficiency of current operations with past
performance, and furnish suitable information relative to
measures taken and planned to Improve agency management Our
task force states in regard to the savings which would result if
its recommendations were adopted: The benefits which would
result from improved financial management cannot be calculated
with any decree of precision but we believe the resultant dollar
savings could reasonaol^ be expecte^ to amount to fo ^lion
dollars which is approximately 84 percent of controllable ;t
expenditures ,°
'The Commission on Organization of the outive branch
of the Government, orce heport on National curity
Orj anization
. Appendix G (Washington, D, 0.: uovernment Printii
Office, 191*9).
The Commission on Organization of the executive uranch
of the uovernment, Report to Congress on | et atiu j>CCQUiitin,L
.
.shin^ton, D. C: uovernment Printing Office, 195:?) » PP« ix> (
65.

9The importance oi' the dollar as a management tool is not
to be denied. Consequently, the military services have, in recenl
years, applied General Somervillo's factors of successful manage-
ment in financial areas. They understand that the country must
have the most effective defense force possible with the dollars
afforded for the purpose. The 2 have put capable men in key
positions to govern the use of these dollars, A workable
organization has oeen established to control funds in the
military. There is a system for carrying on activities involved
in the job. ana there is a method of checking on results.
r\irther, the civilian executives generate the issuance of
directives to sut forth jolicies, authorizations to expend
specific amounts or quotas, and requests for reviews of trans-
actions to check on performance. A3.1 these factors and administr
tivo methods are used to aintain management control. Ana the





VIA .IENT CONTROL AT
In .December 19l|-0, Britain desperately needed materiel
help against the Nasi4* The united States, however, was not
at war; Congress and the people were unwilling to ^ ive Britain
a tremenaous dollar loan to buj war materiels, how to help
Britain without a loan was a seemingly insoluble proble .
On December 2, President Rooscjvelt went on a two-weeks'
Caribbean cruise* He spent those two weeks in thinking over the
problem, searching for the kej i'actor, the novel pattern, ^i'ter
two weeks he returned. He had solved the "impossible" problem.
He called a press conference and explained his simple plan to
help ^ritain. He said:
Now, what I am tr^in^ to do i_s eliminate the dollar si.n »
That is something brand-new in the thoughts of -n this
room, I think- , et ria of the sill;,, foolish old dollar si<n « . . •
ill, let me JLve you an illustration* Suppose m;; neijribor's
home estehes fire, and I have a length of burden hose -^
It is difficult to think in terms of garden hose% or tanks
or size nine BJS combat boots when we have oeen eeousto to usin^
the dollar as a convenient common denominator- in measuring nee .
Mr, Roosevelt reco^ized the necessity of doin£, this early in
^Robert S« Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; an Intimate
History




World War II and the history of that conriict proved him correct.
Here is what happened to the government's budget 3y3tem as
described bj Arthur Smithies I
As the country mobill 1 or total war, the normal budgetary
process became eclipsed. One reason was that the lon<_ and
complicated process coul^ only work in normal times and could
not be readil to rapid char. o. A second reason was
that in time of total mobilization the scarce materiel* of
warfare became more important than monej . Hence, during V/orld
virtually unliinitee suras of mone^ were appropriated to
the military services, and expenditure rates depended on
physical availabilities rather than finance — as witnessed by
the fact that at the end of the war there were some $60 billion
of un.se ropriations on the books.
Thus the military expenditure figures incl ded in the budget
represented targets rather than ceilings. Vhs main traditional
budgetary activity was oirectea to the imposition of severe
limitations on "no...-essential" programs, ven here the
financial system was ^reatl^ assisted by the physical controls.
Personnel of the non-war agencies moved into the more exc.i
and remunerative joos in the war agencies or into the armed
forces. Materiels were not available for an extensive .c
works program, Consequently the Budget bureau directed its
attention mainly to the organization of the Government and to
Gconoidc stabilization, ..idle it performed a leadin^. and
useful role in these respects, it had little voice, in t
determination of the militar -e:. )onditure pro^rar., x
The budgetary process bj which fund3 were normally made
available to the military for expenditure and which afforaee
management a means or correlating and choosin^ operating plans
I almost useless in wartime, 1 .ment stilo. remain!.
some vista^e of the oud^et execution process bj which it could
x Arthur Smitnies, The „ etai
. Process in the united
states . (New £orJ I [6Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), P. 120.
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exert some fiscal controls but the scope and urgency of events
pi-evented manager* from ever havin i to evaluate programs
in terms of dollars. A short view of the conditions which then
obtained was state, o, Luther buxick:
The major systematic method o_ dnistrative
control Is money* It remained for war t . i-onstrate that there
are other t.
:
pes of control, which may be more sensitive and more
useful in ceitain circumstances. During the war, mone^ ceased
to be of any significance as a control, because appropriations
weie unlimited* Administrators 3oon discoverer that controls
based on expenaitures were of little value, while controls
basea on manpower* materiels, ana space; ana processes and
performance: and on schedules based on time were aly
important .^2
T&n Congress during the war sought to establish controls thro
"personnel ceilln-s" rather than through appropriations.
Military management alon^ with the whole of the govern-
ment had to start thinkinL in terms of resources other than
dollars. When military management control and coordination
through limitation of funds was lost, some rationing of materiels
had to be established. Since the militar,. had no centralized
a t enc;y with machine r to allocate resources amont the services,
active competition for production <_oods commenced instantl .
"boSi tics management" specialists rather than "fiscal manage-
ment" experts ca. o into demand. The formation of dozens of
important national wartime agencies and commissions reflected
IP
•^Luther Gulick, a omini strative reflection i rom vorld war
II
.





the recognition of the necessity of raanaJLn^ resources instead
of cash.
orman Miles Somers in disc s fch€ problems of the
Office of war mobilization a. conversion duri. >rld War
said:
Americans learned early in the war thut thin was not ad
of "unlimited resources." There was not enough to satisfy fully
and smoothly the simultaneously increasing ae of a h.
war-r;;akinc machine and of a thriving civilian econo iy« ri arily
because of the competition for limited resources, there do ed
bitter administrative and policy conflicts over such matters as
military requirements and procurement, allocation of scarce




cerinc problems under the best of organization an e-
ment. The^ loomed even larger under the diffusion of responsi-
bility and agency autonomy which lon t. prevailed. 1^
We note no mention of money problems here but there is
ever,, evidence of a lack of overall management coordinati
because there was no effective organization for management control
other than leans of the bud^etar,; process which hed become
useless.
In l c/kk- ^ajor General C. . obinson who was ulrector,
Control division, ^rm,, Service x'orces, described the techniques
used to overcome r:ana<_ement control problems in his organization
durin^ the war. The nrmy Service forces was made responsible
for servicing and suppl^in^ the largest army in .istory of
man l Somers, Presidential A encj . (





the country. Its responsibilities inciudec the procurement
,
storage, distribution, taintenanoe of ail types oi supplies
and equipment, sonstrueti on, the purchase of real property,
transportation, communi cations procurement of personnel, and
medical, legal, financial, postal, and recreational service
for the Army. Its orJ covered practically every type o:
human activity. The "Control Division'' was established to
auvise and assist the commanding general (General Somervllle)
in his overall on - ament job. Its duties were of four main
categories:
1. To review continuously the organizational structure of
the ASF with a vie,, te alscOv©ring duplications, overlappings,
conflicts, inappropriate divisions of responsibility, and
authority, and inadequate coverages of activities, and to
recommend corrective measures.
2. To measure cuantitutively the progress being made in
performing the numerous activities of the ASF by means of
statistical reports ana analyses of statistical data, and to
discover deficiencies ana delays and reasons therefor.
3. To review continuously the procedures being used in
the conduct of the various activities of the AS? with a view
to their improvement, through simplification ~nn stc. Lza-
tion, for the purpose of eliminating nonessentlaJ work and
speeding up the flow of work,
4. To investigate continuously the effects of policies
ana regulations on the achievement of end results, to review
operations, and 10 promote utilization oi the best management
techniques of business and government .-^
This control organization aria the duties assignea it
jor General C. 1 . E binson, "Ifo msnt Control in






reflect recognition of the problem of m the largest
logistics problem the United States has ever haa . „e note
the application of basic principles of mana£ement control in
the outline of auties for the "Control Division" and the
absolute lacK of any attempt in the Army Service Forces duri-
wcrtime to effect such control by collar limitations or the
reviev.s inherent in a budgetary process.
Production was the axi... about ..nich the war economy
turned und upon which the size and effectiveness of the military
depended. Production incluaec not only the fabrication
direct military materiel; it covered the provision of equip-
ment ior essential services such as transportation, communica-
tions, und power as wall. It included the provision of the
supplies of basic raw mater iels. The following is a current
military opinion of the importance of production in war,
largely derived from Vorld War II experience:
Consideration of financial cost are of secoi-dary importance
in war production; \uaiity of product ana speed of production
come first. The vital costs in war production are not costs
reckoned in collars and cents, which can be mei without too
great difficulty by taxation and ^overn^ent borrovin , but
costs ineasured in labor, materials, and equipment. 1?
This philosophy precluded the effective use of I
^Benj^min g, Williams, "Introduction to Economic
M o b i1 i zati on " Emergency Management of t he Nat lonal Economy
,






dollar as a tool of management control in World War II.
Since World V.ar II the organization of the Lepartment
of Defense ana the subsequent strengthening of the powers of
tne civilian secretaries have brought on increased controls in
the area of military management. Military budgets have assumed
a new role ana a new significance. On the budget have hinged
not only the military strategy and program but also the
industrial and economic direction of the country and the
destinies of a democratic nation. The budget has become a
vehicle of decision concerning our economic and political
future in the cola war. However, again the budgetary process
was not effective enough to care for the problems of the
Koreaj . Frederick Kosher says:
An important factor in recent budgets is Korea or, more
accurately, the sfesence of Korea. The projected cost of combat
in Korea was omitted from the annual estimates every year after
fiscal year 1951 up to arid including the Truman estimates for
1954* The military departments have been instructed each year
to assume, in the compilation of their estimates, that there
would be no further combat in Korea after the first of the
fiscal year for which they were budgeting. This was meant, of
course, that the actual cost of Korea must be taken up in
supplemental estimates and in annual estimates for subsequent
years. This may have been because of the difficulty of
estimating so fax in aavance; or because at the time the
estimates were maae the Administration really predicted t!
Korean hostilities would end bet ore the budget period; or
because of the political hazard of predicting continuation
for another year and a half of an unpopular war. Its effects




and to put the services about a year behind In estimating and
obtaining funds, particularly lor procurement. 10
So one budgetary process was usea as a man ,nt
tool lor that part or the military which at peace and
another for that part which was at war. The peacetime system
was not capable of the war task.
Recent history seems to indicate that the control of
finance has not been an effective tool of management in the
military organization at war. However, financial management
methods and the governmental budget process have changed
considerably in recent years. In the following chapter these
improved functions will be examined.
loFrederiCK C. Mosher, Program Budgeting; Theory and
Practic e. (Nei "or : Public Administration Service, American




There can be little question that one of the most effective
tools of the Lecretary of Defense, if not his most effective
instrument of supervision over the three military departments,
is his control 01 the military budget. '
The budget is important to the military touuy. It would
be a mistake to think of it, only as a management tool, important
as this may be. Budgeting is far more. It is first of ail a
work program, a plan, a translation into dollar terms ol program
objectives, and a statement of the country's resources required
to reach these objectives. The magnitude of the military buc
has profound influenoe on the functioning of the whol® economy.
A number of years ago Professor V. 0. Key pointed out
that the most important issue in budgeting was how to allocate
scarce dollars among various activities. -^ * la tor and more
enlightened opinion irom the military view point is stated by
Verne B. Lewis: "The economic aim of budgeting is to achieve
best use of our resources." ^
kosher, op_. cit
, p. 46.
18V. 0. Key, Jr., "The Lack of a Budget Theory," The j>mer ic
Political Lcience Review
, December, 1940, p. 1137.
^Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory 01 Budgeting,* I'ublic
administration Review
,




By comparing the quotations above wo see that the
Secretary of Defense, through the budgetary process, is
exercising supervision over the allocation and use of that
portion of the nation's resources which are being maae available
to the military by Congress and the President. By the delegation
of such supervisory authority down through the chain of command
to the lower levels of military organization, the Secretary of
Defense has established a system of financial control which has
become the primary tool of management in the military, i.e. ources
are controlled by the budget.
I oney is useu as a common denominator for budgeting
because in normal times it represents in general the cost of
scarce resources. In time of extreme scarcity, such as total
war, the money measure or scar* city becomes inadequate. Budgeting
in terms of critical scarce factors such tanpower or strategic
mater iels then tends to replace monetary budgeting; it is usually
called "programming," rather than "budgeting* m
We have seen that in past mobilization c jnoies the
budget process failed to operate. Sinoe those times the process
has been improved and e idate from Congress ^°led the Depart-
ment of Defense to utvelop the concept of financial management.
In doing this the Department established many managerial function






and practices, new to the military, which have proven their
effectiveness in peacetime as a control tool. Some of these
may be effective in war although they are yet t be tested
as applied in the present organization.
As examples, comprehensive comptroller organizations
have been established in all three military departments and for
the Department ol defense as a whole. J ias been largely
transferred to the perfor flan OS pattern with extensive revision
of the appropriation structure. Stook funds have been extended
to include |10 billion of inventories, and installation! doj
billion in annual business have been put on a busi
basis by financing them under industrial funds. Tremendous
strides have been made in extension of financial accounting
ior propei' ty. Progress reporting and statistics has been
recognized ana established as u valuable management tool.
Internal audit organizations have been created on a uniiit
basis in each of the three military departments. All these
things represent the application of recognized commercial
business methods in the military for the announced purpose of
achieving maximum efficiency and economy in maintenance of the
forces in being
.
These methods of business administration and financial
management control have been applied in varying degrees directly
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to many classes of military activities. The operation or poets,
ctmps, air stations, etc. Is conducted usi. morally applicable
commercial practices. i applies to "wholesale" supply
ana distribution systems, and to maintenance and production
facilities. Inventories, except for capital items such as
ships and aircraft, are subject to control through commercial
practice due to their sub: tuntiul resemblance to commercial items.
And inaustrial ana coxanercial type activities which parallel
private business closely are bein^ manatee through techniques
of business administration, financing, and accounting. Other
areas being "commercialized" are research ana development
activities, construction of public works, and medical care.
Only combat units capable of momentary oe.loyment are exempt
from commercial management practices because of their unique
function v;hich has no counterpart in business.
All of these financially managed activities represent
currently about <3> billion in annual expenditure ana utilize
3 million military aj e million civilian employees.
It has been attempted to tie in the financial manage-
ment system with the command una management structure which
operates and controls military progress. Except at the
Secretarial level, coj and - I on si bill ty in the
.
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Department of Defense is largely assigned to military personnel.
The military people operate under pressure from two sources.
The financial management program calls for economy, recognition
of cost, and dollar efficiency • Purely military concepts
require sufficient manpower and materiel at any place ana any
time to minimize potential military risk with only secondary
recognition ol dollar cost factors. From the point of view
of the department secretaries the problem is that of "attaining
harmonious balance between the normal commercial concept of
management with profit incentives and emphasis upon efficiency
and economy, on the one hand, and the military concept of
logistic adequacy, on the other."^
In the Department linancial management of the activities
mentioned previously finds the military jiianagers concerned with
five basic functions: budgeting and funding, accounting
expenditure arm collection of funds, progress reporting, and
statistics, and auditir. . It i s the first of these, budgeting
and funding, whioh affords real and stive management control
from the Secretary of Defense down through the chain of command.
The following is the content of the bai icnts ol eting
and funding:
1. Translation of military or ope; ram and
reprogramming requirements into financial terms.
^•Department of Defense, i judicial Man^ - in the
Department oi Defense . (Draft, Fov ember l°54ip. i>.
-
23
2. Development and presentation of the effects of proposed
budgets or alternatives to assist in the establishment or
olarii ioation of program policies.
3. Preparation ana re vie proposed budgets in conformity
with program policies, applicable performance standards, ana
in consideration of total funds avails bie for specific programs.
4. Once budget decisions have been made, justification,
in conjunct dth operatj jr pro i officials, of proposed
budgets to higher levels in the Executive Branch, and the
Congress, as appropriate.
5. Preparation, review and submission of requests for
apportionment, allocation, or allotment of authorized appropria-
tions, based upon approved operating budgets.
o. In accordance with policies or direction or t
President, Secretary, coj r or . i er, as appropriate,
ana in conformity with approved operating budgets, tr, Lssion
of authority to obligate funds made available th ortion-
ment, allocation, or allotment.
7. Review, analysis, ana follow-up of data provided throu
financial reports with respect to operatic, costs, capital
expenditures, obligations and commitments, investments in
inventories and other property, and status or available fundi ,
8. Day-to-aay analysis el financial implications of
proposed pro revisions, new pro . , and major financial
transactions. ^
The budget fixes the magnitude, the scope, and the uality of
the services which the military will lender I ins
oi ascertaining trie greatest possible return from the expenditure




it affords means of managing by authorizing specific amounts
of resources through a highly centralized organization structure.
It should be notea here that political factors affect
the budget process in the Department of Defense as well as in
other parts of government. John D. Millett says:
.At the same time it must be emphasized at the outset that
the very nature and process of budgeting ia such that mai b-
msnt must necessarily be influenced In great ire by the
larger political implications of budgeting. trative
agencies must prepare budget estimates according to the es
of the chief executive and preferences of the legislature.
Management, therefore, does not have unlimited discretion in
preparing budget estimates. The work of budgeting by manage-
ment is complicates by these external interests which must
necessarily be dominant. ^
ny searching socio-political implications affect the
problem of military financial management and they are outside
factors which are recognized continually in the buaget formula-
tion ana execution process during peaceti . James Forrestal
stateu them plainly in his diary:
There are no easy black and white solutions for the problems
which face this country. Hem to secure the formation of capital
necessary to our plant replenishment, how to secure a tax
system which will provide the incentive and the opportunity for
the incividual acquisition of capital, how to balance between
a military organization sufficiently formidable to give any
country reason to stop, look, and listen, without at the same
time eating our national heads off — these are the segments
of a very complex matter ..hich must trouble tiny citizen who
understands it • •• *
^John D. illett, Management in the Public Service. (New
York: oGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 204*
^James Forrestal, The Forrestal iaries (New York: iidited
by Walter J/ ill is, The Vising -^re ss
, 1951), P . 513.
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So we find that the dollar budgetary process has be6n
improved during this tiuje of ^eace. Military people have been
educated ana integrated into a financial control system which
la appropriately sensitive to the expressions of political
requirements stemming irom sources outside the Department of
Defense. And this system permeates almost every area of
military activity. From the standpoint of peacetime economy
and effectiveness this management control system is the best




..e have seen that financial control in the budgetary
process is our primary means 01 . military resources.
History tells us that thi^ means failed in World ar II, and
when it failed we had few if any management tools to replace
it. The weight of the military expense load on the economy
today forces us to use the dollar as a common denominator in
distributing resources and focuses our attention on the importanc
of fin noial management in the military organization.
Inherent in the budgetary process as it exists today
are two complications which work against its war- tins effectivenes
The first of these is the amount of substantive cetail which now
must be included in appropriation legislation. The seconc is
the iength of time taKen up in the bucget formulation proces:
.
If det-ilea plans in teniis of dollars mutt be provided the
highest levels of oi-.-nization for decision no decentralization
of authority is possible. . uch decen tralizati on i must in
time of war. Ana the rabidity oi change of volume, te
of operations precludes the use of a decision irk.-i;iiig process
which tt. ,s much as two y oax'S to operate. The violent
wartime ch in the supply- ratio which normally




value variances which in many cases make the collar useless as
a comnon denominator for determining need. In such cases
financial controls are ineffective and in cases could be
harmful
.
It seems clear that Defense Depa] i control,
active aa it may be today, woui . be cons bly less eifective
in a mobilization period. And it follows that if finances are
a primary management tool no.,, overall m ament control will
be weakened considerably when war occurs ii thing is not
substituted to make up for its loss. tlstrator* .ill have
to establish controls based on manpower, mater iels; space,
processes anu perf- oej ana on schedules based on time. All
of these must be their concern rather than dollars. ement
in such circumstances must recognize and utilize the
techniques of management. L. . Hoelscher describes them as:
...such processes or phases of management as planning the
program, planning the organization, scheduling the i,
budgeting the operation (in tt >f resources), staffing the
organization, establishing, maintaining and using the facilities
anu a Mint, establish!!) ocedurea and control ovidi
administrative services and facilities, establishing communica-
tions, motivating the organizatioj , . curing evaluation through
reports inspection, establi hing woi s, controili:
in accord with available resources, better performance,
providing strong;' leadership, c maintaining external relation-
ships.*-
25yh, Bf, Hoelscher, "Men ant I. rrov ement Technics.
What Y.e Learned in "-'ubiie Administration During the .,ar (WashiJ
D . G
.




The intensive application of financial man- at in
the military has served to formalize the re tion of many of
these management techni ues in the minds of the military
personnel concerned with management. Comptroller ship organiza-
tions throughout the military now contain personnel «.ho have
been educated in these management practices. Although these
people now accent control of the dollar as a management tool
it is not inconceivable that their talents may well be directed
toward aiding management to control by other methods in case
of war or mobilization.
Probably the greatest value which will accrue from the
intensive use of financial tm t merit practices in peace is the
fact that when war comes military leaders' attention will already
have been airectea t^ the real need for effective i sment
controls of our resources.
Financial ement i. jetime is a necessity in the
military in order to maintain the best possible state oi combat
readiness with the resources made available by the Congress and
the economy. ..here "business-li.Le" practices are proven and
applicable they should be used as a part of this financial
management process. In a perioa c oilization, however,
financial m^n- gement uiid ordinarily successful business methods




personnel must stand ready in such cases to Implement other
.:d£ement techniques which vvill insure maintenance of ade> uate
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